USAF: Accessing WikiLeaks Leaks Violates Espionage Act

By Joshua Carpenter, Random Knuts
February 07, 2011  05:00 p.m. EST

You may want to cover your tracks if you have accessed the WikiLeaks website.  At least that is what a new report is claiming.  The material available to the general public is still classified.  And the simple fact that it is in the public domain does not change that fact.  Issued by the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, the new guidelines state that "...the leaked documents are protected by the Espionage Act and that [any USAF employee, military or civilian] accessing them under any circumstances is [breaking] the law."  Moreover, the announcement highlights the fact that even if the relatives of USAF employees access the information on their private computer, they can be prosecuted as well.

The U.S. military has recently faced backlash for discouraging employee and servicemen and women's access to public resources covering leaked information such as newspapers, websites and most recently in the classrooms.

And the military has not been the only ones discouraged from viewing the cables.  In a knee-jerk reaction, Columbia's International and Public Affairs allotted the State Department enough time to make students fearful of talking about the leaks.  And although the State's announcement was withdrawn, it was in the students' minds long enough to feel immoral the next time they thought about accessing the still-classified files.

Unconventional Warfare: The U.S. Military's 500 Pound Gorrilla

The United States has successfully led the nation through the post-war era.  While being the economic powerhouse from post-1945 up to today, it instigated a military-industrial-academic complex which led to a culture of consumerism and a boom in technological capabilities.  The post-war era became the Cold-War era and now, after the cusp of the millennium had been broken, we have ushered in the information age.  Although the information age may evoke thoughts of super-smart defense technology, infinite-distant remotes or a pulling together of the world's population, there is still one fatal flaw in the policy and operation of the United States' military - the soldiers lack of a basic training in unconventional warfare tactics supported by the U.S. military's failure to fight and win unconventional wars against, at the most, semi-stable adversaries.

After World War II the military began to focus their tactical methods more on a "shock and awe" approach of invasion.  This is the United States military's modus operandi and it is why the United States is such a force with which is not to be reckoned.  These large scale, shock and awe-type strategies were used during both Iraq wars and during both World Wars.  They were also used in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Post-Saddam Iraq.  But the differences in modern warfare and the conventional warfare of the two world wars is simply in the fact that power is limited, but dispersed in a way that is difficult to be detected even through the best of methods.  This shift in focus from an organized modern-warfare state to a dispersed, covert state has led to a unique demand.  Prior to the World War I, the military operated predominately unconventionally.  But after the Second World War the world was introduced to a stronger political state because of a push for the protection of individual rights and a focus on nuclear physics which fueled big science. The Cold War did not help much either, as a fearful nation's over-speculation about the enemy's power over the U.S. led to a drastic increase in weapon production and technological change focused on the ideological and military power of an established nation-state.  The fact that many of the authors who write about world history define it through the Cold War only supports the fact that this focus on being more powerful than the enemy ruled the policy of the United States.  More significantly, it was the focus of preparing for an attack by established nation-states with stable political systems and economies that, ironically enough, led to the most significant weakness of the U.S. military.

Because the United States saw the most powerful threat of the enemy as being an operation from afar, it established political, military and diplomatic strategies, still in place today, which were built on the enemy being a geographically-identified force.  Politically it led to a greater focus on the rights of the individual.  This idea that an individual had basic rights that could be protected, whether they are a dissenter or patriot, necessarily led to opening up the option to dissent without public backlash – whereas in the past there would be public and governmental backlash.  And although not the proverbial glue that holds the ideology of nationalism together, there is an important role that barring one from the expression of their individual rights - whether or not freely chosen - plays in actively supporting their community, state and nation.  The current lack of political unity only supports this.

The fact that the enemy has become a part of many states instead of one has demanded a set of resources which are more spread out.  The Unites State's Ambassador is no exception.  Now, instead of conversing with a representative of the body with which the US desires to relieve conflict, there is no open method of communication because there is no formal state or place to do so.  Moreover, the fact that it is the policy to "not negotiate with terrorists" only exacerbates this problem.  The foreign relations with the enemy is important, but none so important than our defense and the simple fact is that since the change in training after the first and second world war, we have become incapable of successfully waging an unconventional war where, in the end, we are declared the winners.  This is supported many times over by failures in Vietnam and the dire troubles in achieving success in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So what's next?  How does a military, seemingly untrained in unconventional warfare (except for a few special groups), go about making up for 65-years of vital training.  There is no easy answer.  But shifting the public's focus on the individual as a part of a team is a good start and is already in progress.  There could be an increase in funding to Boy Scouts to increase interest in nature, although, this is questionable, given that current funding is in jeopardy due to their stance on homosexuality.  There could be a propaganda effort geared toward the elementary and middle school-aged children to evoke a passion for the outdoors - although controversial, it is not unheard of, just think of how the lesson that "George Washington never told a lie" affected views on honesty, or how textbooks of elementary children are so patriotic, instilling a sense of nationalism.  Whatever it is to be done, it needs to be done fast.  And the issue should be addressed because it is apolitical.  There is no need for major changes in defense spending because it is not the money that brings the problem into existence.  It is simply the method that is used to train our military.  But the only way that there can be a successful change is if those in charge admit that there is a gaping whole in the future defense system and there needs to be some sort of reform to combat such a terrible threat.  Otherwise, this will become a war on our own soil which will obligate the citizenry to become involved and only lead to critical complications of domestic freedoms which play a crucial part in the solidarity of the United States.

Earmarks, Terrorism and the Preparedness of our Local Law Enforcement

Since the attacks on September 11^th there has been a dramatic shift of focus on terrorism in and outside of America.  Since that national tragedy, a mass construction plan of thirty-three building complexes has been initiated – totaling 17 million square feet of space of which we are aware – specifically focused on top-secret intelligence. Moreover, with a federal government drawing from an undisclosed budget and a force of some 854,000 people with security clearance, it is not hard to believe that this focus on terrorism has been well concealed from the public, and hopefully the enemy’s, eyes.  But, even with all of this grandiosity, can America really say that it is as safe, or safer, than before?  More specifically, looking at the periods before and after 9-11, has the drastic increase in funding and resources led to better prepared local law enforcement and does this focus on terrorism affect their ability to keep their locality safe?

Although many of the duties of keeping the nation safe from terrorism have been passed down to the local law enforcement, there are certain vital issues which substantially weaken the prevention or response efforts asked of the local law enforcement officers. Firstly, the literature passed down from an ambiguously structured web of agencies, the federal government, is vague, at best, but it does send a general message of what is expected of the local law enforcement agencies:

·         “Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States

·         Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and;

·         Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur (Jr. 2007)”

Because the algorithm which determines the funding for each city is biased toward lower populated areas, there is often a misallocation of funds, giving more money to those in the lower populated areas than those in the more populated like New York and Washington D.C. which are perceived to be at a higher risk-level for terror attacks.  In academia, determining which type of attack that is most probable is often widely debated, therefore, adding even more ambiguity in local law enforcement prevention and response planning.

            The important gaps that local law enforcement have to deal with boil down to a complete lack of knowledge and understanding, within the federal government, of which determinants efficiently disperse funds.  A good way to address these gaps is by considering the needs and priorities of the local law enforcement agencies, as opposed to just throwing some money at the agencies, saying “protect the people.”  Focusing on this general topic might help identify those variables that play a significant role in local law enforcement prevention and response.  Although the only information available on this comes from a study focused on local law enforcement in South Carolina, there are still some important points that may add to a fuller understanding of the post-9/11 threat of terrorism with which local law enforcement agencies have to deal. 

            The findings of the study highlighted several predictors which substantially indicated local law enforcement’s preparedness of preventing and responding to terrorist attacks.  A few of the variables were, well, predictable.  Agency size played a significant part, as did the accreditation status of the agency.  The presence of a SWAT team played a large part, but this could be contributed to the size of the agency.  Interestingly, agencies that were oriented toward technology played a significant role in local agencies preparedness.  More prevalent than the programs that local law enforcement may have and/or be involved in; federal funding is the key variable and, by far, held the most significance in predicting an agency’s preparedness.  Keeping these findings in mind, the raw, unanalyzed data should provide answers to some questions the author didn’t ask, nor answer.

            The primary concern is for each municipality to be prepared. Looking at funding is only one way to spur questions which would prove to be beneficial in determining the preparedness of local law enforcement.  Pork-barrel spending is often a scapegoat for misallocation. Legislators that earmark legislation for the companies of their localities often cause an overfunding or underfunding of the local law enforcement.  Since pork-barrel spending is often used to send funds to a specific constituency, can the primary predicting variable for terrorism preparedness really be the amount of federal funding an agency receives? I don’t believe so and the author of the study certainly didn’t account for it in his analysis. To account for such a flaw, a contrast of total funding received relative to other agency’s funding might be warranted.  Moreover, identifying the localities that are overfunded and keeping those representatives accountable would also lead to a better distribution of funds.  On the other hand, this misallocation could also be misperceived and could turn out that local law enforcement agencies are working with the legislator’s constituency at a reduced cost.

            The significance of looking into whether there is a connection between pork-barrel spending, the legislator’s constituencies and terrorism preparedness is to establish if the underfunding of law enforcement agencies has any connection with agreements made with private companies by legislators. Once the earmarking issue is thoroughly investigated, then it can be better determined whether this misallocation is due to a flaw in the system or last minute additions to legislation.  Moreover, if there is a significant connection between underfunded localities and cheaper prices, then this may not be a matter of misallocation, but overfunding of the entire system.

Works Cited

• Jr., William V. Pelfrey. "Local law enforcement terrorism prevention efforts: A state level case study." Journal of Criminal Justice, 2007: 313-321.

• "Post documents growth of intelligence since 9/11." Associated Press. July 19, 2009. http://apnews.myway.com/article/20100719/D9H21JGO0.html (accessed October 5, 2010).