Since the attacks on September 11th there has been a dramatic shift of focus on terrorism in and outside of America. Since that national tragedy, a mass construction plan of thirty-three building complexes has been initiated – totaling 17 million square feet of space of which we are aware – specifically focused on top-secret intelligence. Moreover, with a federal government drawing from an undisclosed budget and a force of some 854,000 people with security clearance, it is not hard to believe that this focus on terrorism has been well concealed from the public, and hopefully the enemy’s, eyes. But, even with all of this grandiosity, can America really say that it is as safe, or safer, than before? More specifically, looking at the periods before and after 9-11, has the drastic increase in funding and resources led to better prepared local law enforcement and does this focus on terrorism affect their ability to keep their locality safe?
Although many of the duties of keeping the nation safe from terrorism have been passed down to the local law enforcement, there are certain vital issues which substantially weaken the prevention or response efforts asked of the local law enforcement officers. Firstly, the literature passed down from an ambiguously structured web of agencies, the federal government, is vague, at best, but it does send a general message of what is expected of the local law enforcement agencies:
· “Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States
· Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and;
· Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur (Jr. 2007)”
Because the algorithm which determines the funding for each city is biased toward lower populated areas, there is often a misallocation of funds, giving more money to those in the lower populated areas than those in the more populated like New York and Washington D.C. which are perceived to be at a higher risk-level for terror attacks. In academia, determining which type of attack that is most probable is often widely debated, therefore, adding even more ambiguity in local law enforcement prevention and response planning.
The important gaps that local law enforcement have to deal with boil down to a complete lack of knowledge and understanding, within the federal government, of which determinants efficiently disperse funds. A good way to address these gaps is by considering the needs and priorities of the local law enforcement agencies, as opposed to just throwing some money at the agencies, saying “protect the people.” Focusing on this general topic might help identify those variables that play a significant role in local law enforcement prevention and response. Although the only information available on this comes from a study focused on local law enforcement in South Carolina, there are still some important points that may add to a fuller understanding of the post-9/11 threat of terrorism with which local law enforcement agencies have to deal.
The findings of the study highlighted several predictors which substantially indicated local law enforcement’s preparedness of preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. A few of the variables were, well, predictable. Agency size played a significant part, as did the accreditation status of the agency. The presence of a SWAT team played a large part, but this could be contributed to the size of the agency. Interestingly, agencies that were oriented toward technology played a significant role in local agencies preparedness. More prevalent than the programs that local law enforcement may have and/or be involved in; federal funding is the key variable and, by far, held the most significance in predicting an agency’s preparedness. Keeping these findings in mind, the raw, unanalyzed data should provide answers to some questions the author didn’t ask, nor answer.
The primary concern is for each municipality to be prepared. Looking at funding is only one way to spur questions which would prove to be beneficial in determining the preparedness of local law enforcement. Pork-barrel spending is often a scapegoat for misallocation. Legislators that earmark legislation for the companies of their localities often cause an overfunding or underfunding of the local law enforcement. Since pork-barrel spending is often used to send funds to a specific constituency, can the primary predicting variable for terrorism preparedness really be the amount of federal funding an agency receives? I don’t believe so and the author of the study certainly didn’t account for it in his analysis. To account for such a flaw, a contrast of total funding received relative to other agency’s funding might be warranted. Moreover, identifying the localities that are overfunded and keeping those representatives accountable would also lead to a better distribution of funds. On the other hand, this misallocation could also be misperceived and could turn out that local law enforcement agencies are working with the legislator’s constituency at a reduced cost.
The significance of looking into whether there is a connection between pork-barrel spending, the legislator’s constituencies and terrorism preparedness is to establish if the underfunding of law enforcement agencies has any connection with agreements made with private companies by legislators. Once the earmarking issue is thoroughly investigated, then it can be better determined whether this misallocation is due to a flaw in the system or last minute additions to legislation. Moreover, if there is a significant connection between underfunded localities and cheaper prices, then this may not be a matter of misallocation, but overfunding of the entire system.
Works Cited
- Jr., William V. Pelfrey. "Local law enforcement terrorism prevention efforts: A state level case study." Journal of Criminal Justice, 2007: 313-321.
- "Post documents growth of intelligence since 9/11." Associated Press. July 19, 2009. http://apnews.myway.com/article/20100719/D9H21JGO0.html (accessed October 5, 2010).
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