Government Transparency Leads to Less Privacy

USAF: Accessing WikiLeaks Leaks Violates Espionage Act

By Joshua Carpenter, Random Knuts
February 07, 2011  05:00 p.m. EST

You may want to cover your tracks if you have accessed the WikiLeaks website.  At least that is what a new report is claiming.  The material available to the general public is still classified.  And the simple fact that it is in the public domain does not change that fact.  Issued by the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, the new guidelines state that "...the leaked documents are protected by the Espionage Act and that [any USAF employee, military or civilian] accessing them under any circumstances is [breaking] the law."  Moreover, the announcement highlights the fact that even if the relatives of USAF employees access the information on their private computer, they can be prosecuted as well.

The U.S. military has recently faced backlash for discouraging employee and servicemen and women's access to public resources covering leaked information such as newspapers, websites and most recently in the classrooms.

And the military has not been the only ones discouraged from viewing the cables.  In a knee-jerk reaction, Columbia's International and Public Affairs allotted the State Department enough time to make students fearful of talking about the leaks.  And although the State's announcement was withdrawn, it was in the students' minds long enough to feel immoral the next time they thought about accessing the still-classified files.

Wikileaks' Threat on the U.S. Citizens' Civil Liberties

There is a new terrorist on the block and he is causing quite a bit of a ruckus at the Pentagon.  Wielding a quarter million cables that hold potentially embarrassing accounts of foreign countries given by U.S. Ambassadors, Wikileaks has redefined “leaking” classified information by initiating a series of information “dumps” – or leaks in bulk.  This drive for transparency is not just focused on governments either.

In December of 2010, the figure most associated with the organization, Julian Assange, spoke about a Bank of America hard drive, ostensibly holding pre-meltdown data spurring the company to appoint a damage control council.  The organization does not just operate on a whim.  A copy of all of their files is kept by a company operating in an underground bunker that was made during World War II.  Additionally, the organization keeps a 1.4 gigabyte-sized file named “Insurance,” so if anything happens to Assange the contents would be made public.  Although the file is posted to be a dangling threat to many world governments, it could also serve as a temptation to those that think they can take on such a project.[1]  But the most important issue is that Wikileaks is, in fact, seen as a threat to national security.

Because of the threat that they now pose, the U.S. government has been driven into action.  Most notably, the CIA developed a task force to assess the impact of Wikileaks’ file dumps.  Interestingly enough, very few CIA documents have been in Wikileaks’ hands. That fact necessarily brings about the question of whether or not the task force’s acronym, “W.T.F.,” was deliberate and intent on sending a distinct message to the other agencies that contributed to the compromise of the government’s classification of sensitive information.[2]  But the fact is that Wikileaks busted on the scene quite quickly.  And considering what they have accomplished already, it is only logical to follow up with the question “who is Wikileaks?”

An organization that preaches transparency by leaking secret information should prompt the country’s citizens to demand answers for many important questions before showing any type of support for the organization.  And as a matter of principle, the organization preaching the message ought to live by the motto and values for which it advocates.  But it seems that this is not the case.  For someone who is taking such a solid stand for transparency, they seem to be peculiarly unconcerned with the transparency of their own organization.  It does not stop there.  Front man Julian Assange has been adamant with communicating to volunteers that any type of information they have on him is to be kept secret, prohibiting them from talking to anyone associated with the media.  He has had three prominent volunteers resign because he suspended them from volunteering after they gave out already-known information to the press.[3]  

The most publically criticized hypocrisy the organization has faced is the veil it has placed over its finances.  Because of this lack of transparency, many feel that Wikileaks could be financed by a number of “shady” adversaries, or even the U.S. government itself.

Another ambiguous trait of the organization is the shortage of sources that confirms its board members.  While a record of its consultative board members had been posted on the Wikileaks website at one time, many of those listed have yet to confirm anything close to a consultative relationship with Wikileaks.  But this is the most intriguing part of the organization.

A large portion of those board members listed as “advisers” had no idea they were on the board.[4]  And as far as the other board members are concerned, there are little to no sources that confirm their advising role.  These seemingly loose connections between those on the advisory board and Wikileaks necessarily shifts the focus of the original question.  And with the identity of the advisers and a financial record masked by what is often described as a dictatorship, defining the identity of Wikileaks by looking at the organization, seems to be a lost cause.  Therefore, by defining the dictator, the authoritarian shroud is gradually lifted and the face of a pure, simple quest for truth inadvertently becomes a depraved, complex attack on individual freedom.

With board members unknowingly a part of Wikileaks and key volunteers quitting because of Julian Assange’s dictatorial management approach, the task of painting a picture of the organization proves difficult.  But removing the noise and shifting the focus on Assange yields a much clearer portrait, allowing the intent of the organization to be critically examined as opposed to getting trapped in focusing on its public identity. 

The information available on Assange is limited, but it is known that he is an experienced cryptographer and hacker.  He was taken to court for hacking into “thousands of systems” including a few belonging to the Department of Defense.[5]  An email exchange posted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology shows Assange collaborating with NASA scientist Fred Blonder and Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist Michael C. Neuman on a project nearly two-years before his prosecution.[6]  These scientists were in top positions at prominent national security research institutions.  This puts Assange connected to a seemingly tight-knit community of national security scientists.  And it’s not the only ambiguous trait of his past.

Assange has reportedly attended thirty-seven separate schools and six universities, many of which have yet to be mentioned by name.  Nor is there information or proof of his actual credentials or the work that he had performed prior to the Wikileaks project.  The best information available is in a biography which states that he is a “…prolific programmer and consultant for many open-source projects and his software is used by most large organizations and is inside every Apple computer.”  But yet he has not appeared in any sources open to the public as being a freelance contributor to Apple.[7]

The fact that an advocate for transparency has such a blurry past does very little to support the thought that they are conspiring with others.  It does, though, point out major discrepancies in Assange’s credibility by revealing the possibility of manipulating the public by manufacturing a past that can answer any questions that arise.  And even though there is a need for the anonymity of Assange and Wikileaks’ board members, there is also a need to portray the group as being open and trusted.  But that’s not the case.  Wikileaks has as sketchy and unknown of a past as the governments they seek to change.  Pot, meet kettle.  Of course, there is always the idea that Assange and Wikileaks are funded and controlled by the U.S. government to provide reasoning for internet regulation.  Although it is an interesting claim, it is difficult to prove.

Okay, it may not be a conspiracy, but there are still many questions that need to be answered before I relinquish my foil hat.  The simple fact is that Americans are now in a compromising position because of what Wikileaks has brought to the table.  The possibility of regulating the internet may be laughable, but the reality is that there were reports that both military and university leaders spoke out against reading the cables on line.  It is far from absolute regulation, but it is as close to a knee-jerk reaction that I need to register in my mind that it could very well be a route considered by the government at a later time.

It is clear that Wikileaks is a threat to government transparency.  And much of what is happening parallels a perfect storm that could both obligate and justify the government to go to extremes in combating the organization.  Therefore, even though Wikileaks may be expressing and testing our freedom of speech and press, those rights are contingent upon the extremity the government wishes to go in the name of national security.  When looking back at the PATRIOT act or Ollie North’s Rex 84, it is not so far fetched to see that because of the threat that Wikileaks poses on our government, it, inadvertently, poses a similar threat to our civil freedom.

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[1] http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/12/05/wikileaks-ready-release-massive-insurance-file-shut/

[2] http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/12/cia-wikileaks-wtf.html

[3] ABC | Brian Ross Investigates: Fri, Dec 17, 2010 Season 1 : Ep. 36 (20:08) Air date: 12/17/2010

[4] http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=22437&context=va

[5] http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/wikirebels-documentary/

[6] http://diswww.mit.edu/menelaus/bt/204

[7] http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=22437&context=va

What constitutes a violation of US National Security?

Everyone has an opinion.  And whether or not the opinion is true is not necessarily the most significant factor. The most important issue with an opinion is how well it can be disseminated into the general public.  Moreover, another important aspect of an opinion is how well it can change the public’s mind.  It can be especially damaging if it were to be false, persuading, and reach into the majority of the public.  This is such the case, more so today than any other time in history.  The world, brought so close through technology, has become an intimate place in which to live.  Someone from the United States could very much get to know someone in Germany without moving away from their keyboard or cell phone.  Like many of the advances within the world, not only can it be used for a positive impact on the general public, it can also be used for attack.  At the stroke of the keyboard, sensitive information can be sent to a community of people within milliseconds.  This is the method used by cellular and cyber-bullies as well as others who wish to do damage to larger entities like corporations and governments.  After the actions of some dissenters of the United States government, it became blatantly clear that many of the citizens within the United States do not know what national security is exactly and the steps necessary to secure the future of the largest, most powerful country in the world.  It seems that there is confusion with what information indicates foul play and should be publicized, and which information necessarily needs to be classified.  Most importantly, this culture which calls for government transparency is manufacturing a false sense of justice for the curious by counterfeiting value in the publicizing of sensitive information.

A country’s goal in national security policy is the securitization of those assets, at home and abroad, which guarantee the country’s longevity and are essential for that nation to attain those goals set by its people.  It is not necessarily an easy task securing resources vital to the operation of a country.  And often there are disputes – sometimes violent – over who gets what.  There are also agreements between two parties which lead a country to acquire resources non-violently.  Obtaining resources both violently and non-violently is dependent upon information.  The more informed the government is the better chance they have at controlling that resource.  This information does not just appear out of nowhere, nor does it come served on a silver platter.  It is provided by those people who lay their life on the line, to gather information in a foreign land that is, more often than not, unfamiliar to those working in it.  Although dangerous, this is often the case.  The informants pepper the urban landscape.  Some are recruited in-country, some brought to the country, but all are spies.  These people are often funded with money not traceable to one certain government, person, or company.  But this is not unknown.  As a matter of fact, this is something for which Japan is often noted.  Their equivalent of information gathering agencies, like the CIA and NSA, are those businesses within their country.  In addition to the U.S. government’s use of private businesses as informants, they also have governmental agencies in other countries.  Recruiting of informants for the goings on within the country happens with both businesses and governmental agencies in the U.S.  Although the government agencies are accounted for in the U.S. budget, the businesses which work with the agencies within each respectful country are not.  This is an advantage for the U.S. because it can enter a country by funding an opposition under the radar.  It is often done this way; it is not anything unavailable to the general public.

It should be obvious that the funneling of money to a coup that is set the overthrow or disrupt any foreign country is illegal, regardless if it is done through businesses or by any other means.  It is this very scenario which is the foundation of the United States’ national security policy.  Because of the means by which the government operates to implement and develop its national security policy, there are often many questions which arise concerning the morality of the U.S.’s operations.  Much of the public curiosity originates from the knowing of operations the U.S. was associated with in the past.  The causes for dissent lay in not knowing the correct context in which to view the operations.  This goes for past and present operations.  Dissenting without considering the context of the situation often leads to a mistaken view of the actual intent of the U.S. government’s actions.  And although the context can vary from situation to situation, there are certain situations that necessarily call for the publication of governmental operations.

First and foremost, any actions which violate the constitutional rights of any U.S. citizen in a domestic or foreign land, regardless if it is something necessary to keep the masses safe, should be publicized.  It is better to ask for forgiveness than for permission – especially when those you are protecting are unaware of the gravity of the situation.  One of the most publicized programs of this sort is “Program MKULTRA.”  This program was funded by the U.S. and sought to use U.S. and Canadian citizens to study the effect of many extreme measures (LSD, Isolation, verbal and sexual abuse, etc…) on the human psyche.  Another program, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, was a study on the natural progression of syphilis in the human body.  This was preformed on impoverished African-American sharecroppers which were United States citizens.  But violent acts upon United States citizens is not necessarily the only carte-blanche situation that calls for the immediate publication of government covert actions.

There is a fine line between a major case of human right’s abuses and genocide.  The latter obligates the U.S. to intervene, the former does not.  Any connection of the state to genocide – or “the G-word” as it is known in the State Department, is a crime against humanity itself and any covert or overt programs are difficult to justify, even as an act of national security.  Moreover, a military or violent action against an entire culture of people, justifying it by national security, is considered immoral on many different levels as well as an international crime against humanity.  The repulsiveness of these actions is usually dumbed-down through euphemisms.  For example, in the Rwandan revolution between the Hutu and the Tutsi, the genocide of the Tutsi people was referred to as “bush clearing.”  By referring to the genocide as bush clearing, the seriousness of the acts of murder and rape calmed the public’s perception of the magnitude of the mayhem going on right under their nose.  This is a tactic often used by the Nazi’s in the holocaust, communism in Russia, China, and Cambodia and the Socialist Slobodan Milošević in Yugoslavia.  Therefore, because violations of international crimes against humanity – domestic or foreign – ultimately endanger the criminally acting nation’s civilians and the receiving nation’s civilians, the actions of the state that is violating international law should be publically known.  The problem with human right’s abuse being separated from genocide is one that can only be determined with a definition of both terms.  Most interestingly, the United States government, to the best of my knowledge, has failed to define either.  It is not surprising though, because if there were explicit definitions of the two, it would then obligate the U.S. to intervene in all future escalations – and that is a difficult and demanding responsibility.

So far, the justification for publicizing confidential government documents has been limited to the disclosure of violent acts against citizens of the United States for national security and violence against a specific culture or race because they are a part of the culture or race – regardless if they are in a foreign or domestic setting.  The final point which may justify publicizing confidential government documents is simply any actions a country takes which evoke fear or terror within other people or countries, but more specifically, those actions are being executed without the justification of national security.  And those acts employing a counterstrike should be supported by sufficient evidence, intelligence and information.  Moreover, the intelligence and information is the most important part of these counterstrikes because they hold the keys to the knowledge needed to accurately and successfully defend the country and attack the enemy.  But the most important issue does not end with the obtaining the information, it must be conveyed in a way that is unknown to the enemy.  And regardless of the efforts of the Ambassadors for the U.S., a breech in the confidentiality of the method information is sent to the White House proves disastrous to any foreign relationship, regardless of how strong the relationship was when the line of communication was perceived as secure.  Therefore, any information disclosed to the general public at the expense of national security, should, in fact, be seen as an attack, not only on the confidentiality of our information, but more seriously, as an attack on the United States itself.  And because the information available to a sphere of people unfamiliar with the context of the confidential material - including those in the host country - it should, more importantly, be seen as a lingering threat needing to be taken out, immediately.